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WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-EFFECT OF PRECATORY WoRDs RELATING -ro DisPOSITION OF PROPERTY ON DoNEE's DEATH-After two bequests, each of an
absolute interest in one-third of her property, to a niece and a nephew,1 testatrix
bequeathed the remaining one-third of her estate to her husband " ... to have
and to hold subject to the request hereinafter stated. It, however, is my wish
and desire and I charge my said husband ... to make disposition ... so that it
will not pass to his heirs upon his death, but shall revert, after his death, to my
heirs and be distributed to the legatees named in subparagraphs A. and B. of
this clause Eighth ... subject, however, that my husband shall be at full liberty
to use, have and keep all the income ... and so much of the principal and corpus
as he may find convenient and desirable for his comfort, advantage and enjoyment.... " Plaintiff2 petitioned for a construction of the will, contending that
the bequest to the husband was of something less than a fee. The lower court
adopted this construction, but on appeal, held, reversed. In the light of the
husband's right to invade the corpus of one-third portion of the estate, the
testatrix intended to invest in him an absolute fee supplemented by an unenforceable desire that he dispose of the property on his death to her heirs.
Grover v. Wood, 337 Mich. 467, 60 N.W. (2d) 316 (1953).
The proposition universally announced, although seldom of any aid, is that
the intent of the testator is the polestar of construction.3 That the Michigan
court effectuated this intent in the principal case seems somewhat doubtful.
Because of the power of the husband to dispose of the corpus of his share of
the estate for his own benefit, the court had difficulty in concluding that the
terms of the will gave him anything less than a fee. Although it is frequently
announced that where a donee is vested with absolute enjoyment, the natural
construction of additional precatory language is that it expresses the testator's
wish without imposing an obligation,4 it is equally true that this does not pre-

These bequests were made in subparagraphs A and B of clause eight of testatrix' will.
Legatee under subparagraph B of clause eighth.
3 "The primary question in every case is the intention of the testator, and whether in
the use of precatory words he meant merely to advise or influence the discretion of the
devisee, or himself to control or direct the disposition intended." Phillips v. Phillips, 112
N.Y. 197 at 205, 19 N.E. 411 (1889).
4 See cases collected in 49 A.L.R. 36 (1927); 70 A.L.R. 329 (1931); 107 A.L.R. 912
(1937). See also, 1 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §48 (1951).
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elude such words from having a mandatory effect if it is clear that the testator
so intended.5 Many decisions have found a trust on language much weaker
than that employed by the testatrix in the principal case.6 But certainly the
particular words used are not of exclusive significance in determining whether
or not the testatrix intended to create a binding obligation. Aid should be
sought in a consideration of other parts of the will. 7 In the light of testatrix'
bequests to her niece and nephew in fee and her later reference to them in the
bequest to her husband, it would seem that her intent was to liminhe rights of
her husband, although at the same time giving him the power to use the
principal for his own benefit during his lifetime. It appears that in reaching its
decision the court was influenced by the difficulty of fitting this loosely conceived arrangement into customary concepts of property interests. Aside from
the availability of the precatory trust analysis,8 adequate authority exists which
would have supported a determination that the will created successive legal
interests, viz., a life estate coupled with a power to consume the corpus and a
vested remainder.9

Donal.d M. Wilkinson, Jr., S.Ed.

See cases collected in 49 AL.R. 38 (1927); 107 AL.R. 912 (1937).
See 49 A.L.R. 42 (1927); 70 A.L.R. 330 (1931); 107 A.L.R. 916 (1937), as to
the effect given various precatory expressions.
7 See 1 BoGBRT, TRUSTS AND TnusTBBS §48 (1951).
s Williams v. Williams' Committee, 253 Ky. 30, 68 S.W. (2d) 395 (1934); Merrill
v. Pardun, 125 Neb. 701, 251 N.W. 834 (1933). The report of the case under consideration mises some doubt as to whether a possible trust analysis was ever presented to the
court.
9 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 49 N.W. 513 (1891); Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich.
689, 71 N.W. 1111 (1897); In re Mallary's Estate, 127 Mich. 119, 86 N.W. 541 (1901);
Bateman v. Case, 170 Mich. 617, 136 N.W. 590 (1912).
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